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Planes, Plans, Plots: How They Found the Missiles 
David M. Keithly 
 
Introduction 
This overview of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is designed to illustrate the phases and steps of 
the intelligence process, while also developing a basic conceptual framework for intelligence 
analysis.  Initial focus is upon the intelligence product. The second part of the study puts in 
practice the “target-centric” intelligence process advocated by Robert M. Clark.1 This process 
assists analysts and customers to fulfill the three basic tasks of asking the right questions, 
properly using existing intelligence, and creating new information by assembling all participants 
in the production of sound intelligence. With intelligence analysts having too little input in 
intelligence planning (developing research problems and research design), difficulties can arise 
about the reliability and validity of intelligence products.   
 
Working at different levels of analysis, the intelligence analyst can identify various pieces of a 
multidimensional puzzle. But can these pieces be put together into a more general theory, one 
that has both descriptive and predictive functions? For the purposes of this discussion, the 
intelligence analysts are grouped into two anonymous Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) teams 
and represent actual members of the U.S. intelligence community, whose alert and prompt 
actions during the summer and autumn of 1962 caught the Soviet Union sneaking missiles and 
troops into Cuba.2 The stage was set for the hottest hour of the Cold War.3 
 
Substance of the Shadow 
On August 27, 1962, two groups of intelligence analysts were assigned to prepare a preliminary 
report on the Cuban military buildup to be distributed to the Board of National Estimates on 
August 29. The request for the report had been stimulated by information received on August 24 
regarding the unusually large number of Soviet and East Bloc ships docking in Cuban ports. 
Their report was to incorporate information then available from various intelligence sources. 
Teams One and Two had been involved in the review of Cuban intelligence information during 
1962. Team One incorporated into its files evaluations of photographic information received 
from high altitude (U-2) reconnaissance flights and from long-range ocean surveillance by naval 
patrol aircraft. Team Two had possession of reports collected from refugees, exiles, and other 
human sources. 
 
Both teams were present at the press briefing held by Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research at the State Department, on the previous Friday, August 24. Hilsman 
stated that the Soviet ships docking in Cuba had unloaded transportation, electronic, and 
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construction equipment along with communications vans, radar vans, trucks, and mobile 
generators. Hilsman said this equipment would be used to improve coastal and air defenses, and 
speculated that the equipment might include surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  The possible 
existence of SAMs would become the primary focal point for the initial CIA team review. 
 
Team Two had been monitoring the increase in Soviet shipping to Cuban ports for some time. 
During July, thousands of refugee reports had been received that indicated a substantial increase 
in import activity at the Cuban ports of Mariel and Havana. Because refugee reports following 
the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion tended to exaggerate Soviet activity in Cuba, Team Two 
suggested that these reports needed confirmation prior to acceptance as reliable information.  R. 
Jack Smith, head of the Office of Current intelligence at the time, recalled that the Director of 
Central intelligence (DCI) John McCone played an initial hunch:  
 
“We had just begun to get some evidence that something more than antiaircraft missiles 
were going in, from agent reports and refugees who said the Russians were building a big 
force to attack the United States. We needed U-2 over flights to establish this, and so we 
got authorization.  McCone had all along said that the Russians were not putting in 
antiaircraft missiles just for the fun of it: they were putting them in to defend something, 
and that was missile capability or something of that sort.”4 
 
With the aid of Team One’s review of the Navy reconnaissance photographs, Team Two was 
able to confirm a marked increase in shipping. The analysts noted that during each of the first six 
months of 1962, an average of fifteen Soviet and other East Bloc dry cargo ships, in addition to 
four Soviet passenger ships, had docked at Cuban ports. But during July and August, over thirty-
seven Soviet dry cargo ships and six passenger ships had arrived in Cuba. Team Two also noted 
that previous materiel shipments to Cuba had been made on ships chartered to the Soviet Union, 
but indicated that all known shipments to Cuba during July and early August were carried on 
Soviet ships manned exclusively by Soviet crews. Team One further remarked that none of the 
cargo carried on these ships had been loaded above deck. The arrival of these ships corresponded 
with refugee reports that ships were unloaded at night by Soviet personnel and that all Cubans 
were excluded from docks and loading areas. Some of the refugee reports had been quite explicit 
in their references to missiles, but in the absence of photographic confirmation, the analysts were 
inclined to discount these reports pending concrete evidence. The hearsay was nonetheless 
sufficiently disturbing for the analysts to follow up on the rampant RUMINT (rumor 
intelligence). 
 
Upon completing the initial evaluation of the U-2 photographs, Team One concluded no SAMs 
or other type of missiles had yet been deployed in Cuba. The photographs revealed only the 
usual military transportation vehicles supplied to Cuba and the MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 
fighter aircraft, which were known to be in Cuba at the time. As a result of their review, the two 
teams viewed the buildup in supplies and materials on a preliminary basis as defensive in 
purpose, as suggested earlier by Hilsman. They continued to assume that the arrival of Soviet 
personnel was an indication of increased technological assistance in the installation and 
operation of the complex equipment recently acquired. The use of SAMs for defensive purposes 
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was viewed as possible, but there was, as yet, no firm evidence of such deployment.5 The 
analysts urged the continuation of both types of reconnaissance flights in anticipation of possible 
SAM shipments, and with an eye to furnishing more information regarding the nature of the 
materiel and personnel already arriving in Cuba. They emphasized that no confirmation had been 
received of missile-related activities at the dock areas, nor of the presence of Soviet ground 
combat units. 
 
Their report was sent to the Board of National Estimates where it was received and reviewed on 
August 29. The Board then notified the group responsible for overhead reconnaissance of the 
decision to maintain routine air reconnaissance. The decision of the Board, based on the reports 
of the two CIA teams, was distributed throughout the intelligence community on August 30, 
1962.6 The members of the overhead reconnaissance group then proceeded to review the 
collection plans that had been in effect prior to that date. At this time, the decision to continue U-
2 flights at previously established intervals was justified on the grounds that the installation of 
ballistic missiles would be discovered by aerial reconnaissance before they could become 
operational.  
 
The U-2 flights were then tentatively scheduled for 5, 10, 17, 26, and 29 September. On the basis 
of current intelligence and excluding the results of the U-2 over flights of August 29, which had 
not been evaluated, none of the previous reconnaissance photographs had revealed the presence 
of missiles in Cuba. The consensus was that current intervals for the flights would allow the 
United States sufficient lead time to determine policy if ballistic missiles were observed.  Many 
in the intelligence community seemed reluctant to view the military buildup in Cuba as other 
than for defensive purposes.  For instance, a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 
written in early October, held that ground-to-ground missiles would probably not be installed.7 
 
Meanwhile, the unprocessed film from the U-2 over flight of August 29 had been transferred by 
air to Washington from the Florida base and was immediately taken to the photographic 
interpretation center. To ensure proper exposition of the photographs, the coordinating authority 
for Cuban intelligence directed the photographic interpreters to review pictures of ICBM, IRBM, 
and MRBM sites taken by U-2s over Soviet territory. These photographs typically showed SAMs 
protecting surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in a trapezoidal configuration to lower the profile 
of the sites, thereby reducing the efficacy of aerial reconnaissance. In addition, analysts reviewed 
data about Soviet combat aircraft and kept a careful lookout for the deployment of new weapon 
systems to Cuba.  
 
By the middle of the first week of September, the results of the over flights had been compiled 
by Team One, which in turn made a startling observation. Evidence of SAM deployment was 
found in eight locations in Cuba. While five of the SAM sites were still under construction, three 
were already operational. Naval reconnaissance photographs, also taken on August 29, revealed 
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the recent installation in Cuba of KOMAR-class (mosquito) patrol boats, each equipped with two 
anti-ship missile launchers. The presence of these boats, developed primarily for coastal defense 
by the Soviets, was judged by Team One to be compatible with Cuban and Soviet statements that 
armaments would be made available to Cuba for defense against invasion by the United States. 
The newly constructed SAM sites were a different matter. Their installation would explain, for 
example, the careful maintenance of secrecy surrounding the arrival of the Soviet ships and the 
influx of technical personnel. In light of the standard SAM protection mission on Soviet ICBM 
sites, the team became dubious about the strictly defensive nature of Soviet weapons in Cuba. 
The team decided to notify the coordinator of Cuban intelligence that it could not exclude the 
possibility of the pending deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba that would provide a nuclear 
strike capability against the United States. The question raised was whether the Soviets were 
attempting to somehow reshuffle the deck. 
 
Later that week, a presidential statement alluded to the presence of the SAMs in the Caribbean as 
revealed by the U-2 photographs. Kennedy’s warning to Cuba and the USSR was explicit in its 
emphasis that the United States would not tolerate the deployment of Soviet offensive missiles in 
the Western Hemisphere. The possibility of such a missile capability led the Senate on 
September 7 to forewarn about the invoking of the Monroe Doctrine in the event that ballistic 
weapons were deployed to Cuba. At the same time, the Senate approved the activation of reserve 
units as a clear signal of intent. 
 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev replied to the American warnings by stating that the Soviet 
Union had no need to locate missile bases outside Soviet territory in places such as Cuba. He 
insisted that the range and accuracy of Soviet ICBMs was sufficient to preclude the necessity of 
missile deployment outside of Soviet territory or beyond complete Soviet control. His comments 
drew upon prior Soviet policy statements that only obsolete and non-critical military equipment 
was deployed to non-Communist countries. 
 
The Case for Gloom 
By early October, however, Team One became convinced that the Soviets were indeed preparing 
to install an offensive missile capability in Cuba. The U-2 over flight of September 5 had shown 
additional work on the SAM sites already detected on August 29. No clear evidence of SSMs yet 
presented itself, but the flight revealed for the first time the operation of MiG-21 aircraft in the 
area.  MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters had been deployed to Cuba from the Soviet Union beginning 
in 1961. The MiG-21 was a new factor: it was an advanced, high-performance aircraft that had 
been deployed to only a few countries outside the USSR. It was equipped with air-to-air missiles 
(AAMs), while the MiG-17 and MiG-19 were equipped only with two 23mm guns. The MiG-21s 
were much faster, with maximum speeds of nearly 1200 miles per hour, as compared to the 
approximate speed of 800 miles per hour for the MiG-19. The MiG-21s were thus a more 
effective threat to U.S. attack aircraft, and one team member observed that their deployment was 
standard procedure for protecting Soviet missiles sites. This circumstance further increased 
apprehensions about the possibility of such an offensive weapon capability being introduced into 
Cuba.8 
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The September 10 U-2 flight was canceled because of political disaffection in the wake of 
Kremlin bluster about a U-2 flight over Soviet territory earlier that week.9 The flight of 
September 17 produced few results, mostly because ground fog had obscured the SAM sites. 
Naval reconnaissance flights of late September, however, furnished information that only 
heightened CIA concerns. Photographs taken on September 20 showed two Soviet freighters en 
route to Cuba. Large crates were evident on their decks, and CIA analysts noted their odd zigzag 
shape. Following comparison with other information, a Team One analyst was able to determine 
that the length and shape of the crates coincided with the specifications of the Soviet Ilyushin 28 
(IL-28 Beagle) light jet bomber. The Il-28 had been operational since 1950, and U.S. intelligence 
knew that this aircraft, armed like the Mig-17 and Mig-19 with cannon for aerial combat, was 
also capable of carrying a nuclear weapon payload. Other collection agencies were asked 
immediately to track the crates, with the aim of confirming the conclusions of the photographic 
interpreters. Ten days later, a report was received indicating that the crates had been delivered to 
an unused airfield where the Beagles would apparently be assembled. Team One estimated that it 
would probably take the Cubans about two months to render the aircraft operational. 
 
Other Navy photographs of late September showed Soviet freighters (similar to Figure 1) with 
70-foot hatches and bulk cargo transport vehicles on decks. The ships were identified as Soviet 
lumber ships, which would explain the oversized hatches, and it was notable that some types of 
ballistic missiles were about sixty feet long.10 Coincidence? The freighters were riding high 
enough in the water to indicate low-density, high-volume cargo.11 No knowledge of the cargo of 
these ships was received from collection services in Cuba. Team One knew only that the ships 
had been unloaded at night, and that the cargo was transported under heavy military guard to an 
unknown destination east of Havana. 
 
Figure 1: Soviet Freighter with 70-foot Hatches. 
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During September, two classified intelligence reports contributed to the growing suspicions 
about the nature of the military buildup on Cuba. Data and information about the development of 
missile systems of all types in the Soviet Union were being carefully evaluated. Patterns were 
noted. Technical developments continued to be marked by strenuous attempts to conceal test 
sites from U.S. reconnaissance. Yet U.S. intelligence was able to determine that ballistic missiles 
of intercontinental, intermediate and medium-range were being equipped with mobile, 
caterpillar-tracked launchers. The Soviets began deploying road-mobile missiles in various forest 
sites to minimize U.S. aerial detection. Among other things, the mobile ballistic missiles would 
make counterforce targeting much more complex. 
 
Such information reawakened analysts’ interest in some of the photographic details of the Cuban 
SAM sites. Attention was quickly drawn to the photographs of the San Cristobal site and of the 
Sagua La Grande site. Both of these sites seemed to be in unusual geographic locations in thick 
woods. The San Cristobal area photographs had revealed the presence of SAMs by late August. 
San Cristobal itself was located about 100 miles east of Havana and was readily accessible to 
supply routes from the port of Havana. Since both the San Cristobal and the Sagua La Grande 
sites were heavily wooded, they afforded natural protection from observation and, in that sense, 
bore an uncanny resemblance to the most recent Russian areas of mobile missile testing and 
development. Team One noticed also that the San Cristobal SAM sites were placed in a 
disturbing trapezoidal pattern, which was a usual feature of the configuration of Soviet ICBM 
sites. A four-slash pattern was also evident within the SAM-protected area, which was also 
typical of Soviet missile installations. The Sagua La Grande site showed the same four-slash 
pattern, although the most recent photographs had not indicated that the SAMs were operational. 
 
With growing apprehension, both teams now began to presume the clandestine installation of 
offensive ballistic missiles on the island, and in consequence they requested immediate 
additional aerial surveillance of all missile sites detected by the previous reconnaissance over 
flights.  Available information regarding the influx of materiel and personnel to Cuba was 
sufficient to conclude that the broader purpose was to provide a nuclear strike capability against 
the United States. The presence of the SAMs, their deployment locations, their sudden 
appearance and rapid installation, were indicative of an almost reckless offensive gamble. The 
Soviets, as far as was known, had not heretofore deployed nuclear weapons outside the borders 
of the USSR.  In light of this circumstance, some CIA analysts hypothesized that Cuba offered 
the Kremlin a new opportunity. The sheer distance from the USSR made Cuba unique among 
Communist countries. As wary of socialist allies as of capitalist adversaries, the Soviet leaders 
could safely conclude that medium-range and intermediate-range missiles transferred to the 
Caribbean could never be turned to threaten Soviet territory. Hence, the Kremlin apparently 
believed it could affect the weapons transfer with relative impunity.  Such a strike capability in 
Cuba would enhance Soviet bargaining power with the United States in any future confrontation, 
such as during standoffs over Berlin. It would afford a much more potent striking power against 
North America, reducing the warning time for a missile attack from fifteen minutes to about one 
minute, seriously limiting the ability of the United States to deter or circumvent the launching of 
the missiles. Cuban missiles offered the sweetener from the Kremlin’s perspective of increasing 
Cuban President Fidel Castro’s public image and bolstering his influence in South America. 
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The request for additional U-2 over flights to monitor the San Cristobal, Sagua La Grande, and 
other SAM sites then hit a bureaucratic snag, resulting in a delay for over a week. The 
heightened danger to U-2 pilots as the SAMs became operational, along with the fact that U.S. 
aircraft over Cuba had already been fired upon in early September caused considerable disquiet 
among the members of the overhead reconnaissance group. Previously, all U-2 flights over Cuba 
had been under the command of the CIA. The latter developed control centers for its U-2 
operations and trained its own pilots for the missions. Despite CIA objections, the overhead 
reconnaissance group now decided that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) should take over the 
flights. The flights were therefore delayed while SAC pilots were trained in the operation of the 
U-2. On October 14, the pilots were ready, and the first U-2 missions under SAC’s control took 
place. Nearly ten days had passed since Team One’s request for immediate additional 
reconnaissance activity over the suspected missile sites. 
 
In anticipation of the U-2 flights on October 14, a Team One analyst briefed the photographic 
interpreters about the likelihood that the aerial photographs would reveal the presence of 
offensive missiles, recommending they focus their attention on areas where SAM sites had been 
detected. He explained the significance of the SAM trapezoidal configuration as it was employed 
on Soviet SSM sites, deliberating upon the four-slash ground pattern, the equipment used, and 
the typical buildings used for storage and missile control on Soviet airfields. The film was 
received later that day and promptly developed at the center. 
 
Dawn Like Thunder 
The photographic interpreters then began the tedious job of examining each of the thousands of 
individual frames of film (Figure 2). By late afternoon, October 15, the results began to 
accumulate. At San Cristobal, eight medium-range ballistic missiles, still loaded on their missile 
trailers, were discovered.12 Four missile erectors were already in position. Missile fuel trailers 
and other vehicles were identified, despite attempts of the Soviet technicians to camouflage 
them. Also visible was a tent city, capable of housing 500 personnel. At the Remedious SAM 
site, launch pads for intermediate-range ballistic missiles were detected. The four concrete pads 
were already close to completion. Two control bunkers were in place, and a tent city, similar to 
the one at San Cristobal, had been erected. The Sagua La Grande site had been an empty field six 
weeks earlier. Now, the analysts were able to identify mobile medium-range ballistic missiles on 
missile trailers near the launch pads. Two of the four launch pads on this site were already 
equipped with launchers. Groups of military transport vehicles, a tent city, and three completed 
buildings, which would probably house missile control centers, were also detected. At Guanajay, 
in western Cuba, another four partially completed launch pads were visible on the photographs. 
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Figure 2: Example Film Frame Examined by Photographic Interpreter. 
 
 
Thus the analysts obtained the proverbial smoking gun. Team One immediately notified the chief 
of intelligence operations and supplied him with copies of the photographs and a hastily written 
summary of the strike capability now present in Cuba. From the configuration of the sites and the 
nature and amounts of equipment visible, Team One determined that the ballistic missile 
installations were exclusively a Soviet operation. Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) Ray 
Cline later noted: “The photo experts alerted me to what they had found late in the afternoon of 
Monday, October 15, and my missile experts assured me we were seeing a major investment in 
nuclear missiles that would double the number of nuclear warheads the USSR could fire on the 
United States.”13 
 
On Tuesday morning, October 16, Cline presented the President with the hard evidence of Soviet 
offensive missile deployment in Cuba. The President immediately requested that U-2 over flights 
be increased to twenty missions during the next six days. He demanded that the strictest security 
measures be employed regarding the detection of the missiles and observed by personnel 
involved in analytical activities. He then requested that a group of trusted advisers be brought to 
the White House for consultation. This assemblage of luminaries, called the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), would meet regularly during the 
following weeks.14 Their job was be to assist the President in the interpretation of Soviet activity, 
in the establishment of action plans based on current intelligence, and in the estimation of all 
conceivable consequences of proposed courses of action.15 
 
With the deployment of the missiles verified, groups of intelligence analysts were tasked to 
determine the precise scope and nature of the total Soviet military deployment to Cuba. The 
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number, configuration, location, and state of readiness of the missiles were to be carefully 
assessed. Team One prepared and distributed the first report on October 18. Incorporating the 
information resulting from the analysis of the intensified U-2 flight surveillance, it noted that 
twenty-eight launch pads were under construction at ten sites. Team One estimated that 
completion of the sites would result in forty launch pads. The photographs of the Sam Cristobal 
site (Figure 3) revealed eight medium-range ballistic missiles to accommodate the four launch 
pads under construction. It estimated that if each of the other launch pads was similarly supplied 
with back-up missiles, a total of eighty missiles could then be present in Cuba. As yet, the 
analysts were unable to identify nuclear warheads attached to the thirty visible missiles, but they 
assumed that several unusual dome-shaped buildings had been constructed to store warheads. 
 
Figure 3: Sam Critobal Site. 
 
 
The two types of missile sites that had been detected were those for the intermediate-range, 
fixed-position missile with a range of up to 2200 nautical miles, and the 1200-nautical-mile, 
mobile, medium-range missile.16 From detailed reports of the capability of Soviet mobile 
missiles, Team One knew that mobile missile sites could be dismantled, transferred to another 
location, and reassembled within six days. With the existence of prepared sites, the mobile 
missiles could become operational in a matter of hours. If the Soviets deployed such new 
missiles in Cuba—and there was every indication they had-- Team One realized their features 
and capabilities would lower the original estimates of the readiness of the sites. According to 
prior assessments it might take as long as six weeks for the IRBMs to become operational and 
about four weeks for the MRBMs. On the basis of the rapid progress made on the installations in 
previous days, Team One hypothesized that some of the medium-range ballistic missiles could 
be operational within twenty-four hours. 
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As of October 18, Team One had not received evidence to verify the allegations that Soviet 
ground combat units were present in Cuba. Since Soviet personnel debarking from ships at 
Havana and Mariel had been observed as wearing only civilian sports clothes, observers assumed 
that they would serve as technical consultants assisting in the installation of the complex 
technical equipment currently arriving. While Team One knew that the missile sites were 
guarded by Soviet military personnel, and that Cubans were not allowed on or near the sites, they 
were aware that no photographic confirmation had been received regarding combat units. The 
report estimated that 5000 Soviet technical personnel were working on weapon systems in Cuba. 
 
Accordingly, President Kennedy moved swiftly in the few days that remained before the Soviet 
missiles became operational.17 There was no time for long-winded discussions in the UN or even 
with NATO allies, though he did confer with Congressional leaders. On October 22, the 
President made public the presence of the Soviet ballistic installation in Cuba and initiated the 
blockade or “quarantine” that was to encompass Cuba for the next few weeks. In a nationwide 
television appearance, he grimly announced the “quarantine” on all ships carrying weapons to 
Cuba.18 So grave was the crisis and so convincing the photographic evidence that the 
Organization of American States (OAS), in an unusual display of unity, voted unanimously to 
support the United States.19 Missiles that could shoot north could also shoot south. The President 
demanded the immediate and complete removal by the Soviets of the ballistic missiles, SAMs, 
the supporting and operating equipment for both missiles and bomber aircraft. He did not include 
in his statement a demand for the removal of organized combat units since confirmation of such 
a deployment was pending. To continue the flow of information on the installations and 
equipment, additional low-level reconnaissance flights were authorized. Navy RF-8A aircraft, 
operating in groups of four to eight, flew two or three missions daily for the next week. 
 
Ballistic Blackmail 
Officially, Washington was stunned by the aerial photographs revealing that hundreds of Soviet 
technicians were emplacing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. With this supplement 
to its strategic arsenal, the Kremlin had the opportunity to get tough in the world’s hotspots.  The 
United States, facing almost immediate nuclear weapons attack, might have to submit.20 In a 
sardonic way, Cuba’s made-in-Moscow muscle was indeed defensive, because the United States 
would never dare attack the island if the swift result would be the devastation of several major 
American cities. At the same time, Castro would have a free hand to export his revolution to the 
rest of Latin America. 
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The establishment of Cuba as a missile-launching pad, a move that would upset the world 
balance of power, constituted the most lethal challenge ever to confront the Monroe Doctrine. 
Working through the Cuban leadership, Khrushchev could presumably cow the United States 
and take over parts of the Western Hemisphere.21 The presumed menace of the Holy Alliance in 
1823 or Napoleon III’s Central American adventures during the U.S. Civil War seemed child’s 
play when compared with such a prospect.   
 
International law does not sanction a blockade in time of peace, though Kennedy called it a 
“quarantine,” and moreover the Cold War was hardly peace. The blockage of merchant ships on 
the high seas in peacetime ran afoul of the hallowed American principle of freedom of the seas.22 
It is ironic that two basic policies here clashed: freedom of the seas and the Monroe Doctrine. 
The United Nations Charter forbade the use of force or threats of force in such instances, except 
in “self-defense if an armed conflict occurs (Article 51). Cuba had not started shooting yet. Some 
legalists argued that in this instance the potential danger was so great as to constitute an armed 
attack. If Soviet ships refused to stop and be searched for offensive weapons, U.S. commanders 
were authorized to fire upon them. Soviet submarines prowled Caribbean waters, and if they shot 
back, World War III might have been unleashed. 
 
Reconnaissance flights brought back the alarming photographs that indicated continuing work on 
all missiles sites, despite the President’s stern warnings. Then, the RF-8A low-level flight 
photographs (Figure 4) yielded clear evidence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. By late October, 
organized units had been detected in forty-seven locations throughout the island. Three Soviet-
built airfields were located with some twenty Beagle bombers being rapidly assembled. 
 
Figure 4: RF-8A Low-Level Photographs (Overlaid on Google Earth). 
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Avenues of negotiation were kept open nonetheless. Kennedy communicated directly with 
Khrushchev at the most critical stage, and the Secretary-General of the UN did yeoman 
mediatory work. Kennedy had not specifically invoked the musty Monroe Doctrine, but the 
principle was clearly present and Congress had already made mention of it. A deadly earnest 
United States was not bluffing; if the Soviets did not take their missiles out of Cuba, U.S. armed 
forces would seize or destroy them, Russian technicians, troops  and all.23 On October 27, when 
a U-2 aircraft was shot down over Cuba, there seemed to be no indication that the Soviets would 
comply with the President’s demand. Then, rather suddenly, word was received from Moscow 
that the Soviets would begin to dismantle the missile installations and ship them back to the 
Soviet Union. At that time, the Executive Committee knew that six MRBM and three IRBM sites 
were operational and that about 22,000 Soviet ground troops were in Cuba. Twenty-three 
underground arsenals had been constructed and about seventy IL-28s had been delivered. 
 
Hence, Khrushchev veered away from the collision course. The Kremlin did not desire a nuclear 
incineration over Cuba. Khrushchev had gravely miscalculated the fiber of Kennedy and the vital 
concerns of the American people, reaching far back into the nineteenth century. A number of 
Cuban-bound Soviet ships turned back, and the others never challenged the blockade. After 
anxious interchanges, a compromise settlement was announced on October 28, whereby 
Khrushchev agreed to pull his offensive weapons out of Cuba, under verification by UN 
representatives; Kennedy agreed to lift the “quarantine” and not invade the island. 
 
The Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement was never fully honored. The Soviets, with remarkable 
speed, crated all their missiles and shipped them home, together with most of the bombers. But a 
jilted Castro, humiliated before the world, defiantly stood on his sovereignty by refusing to 
permit on-site inspection.  As long as he did so, Kennedy was released from his provisional no-
invasion pledge. 
 
The Kremlin, which traditionally knew how to practice strategic retreat, suffered a spectacular 
setback.24 Yet its propaganda machine ground out the line that since it had gone to the defense of 
Castro, and since it had secured a no-invasion pledge, it had saved Cuba. Hence the missiles 
were no longer needed. As custodians of the dove of peace, the Soviets had averted catastrophe 
and “saved civilization” at a time when the “adventuristic warmongers” of the Pentagon seemed 
insanely bent on nuclear war. But the Chinese Communists harbored no illusions: they accused 
Moscow of “capitulationism” for having turned tail and betrayed the Cuban comrades.25 
Khrushchev sternly reminded them that although the United States might be a paper tiger, it had 
“nuclear teeth.”26 In the ensuing months the Kremlin, presumably thrown off balance, soft-
pedaled the explosive Berlin issue. 
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Soviet Strategic Priorities 
The USSR found itself in an unfavorable strategic position in the early 1960s. The lack of large-
scale Soviet ICBM deployments and the sizable and expanding U.S. strategic arsenal had led to a 
reversal of the missile gap. Moreover, the dramatic disclosure in mid-1961 that the United States 
was able not only to count but to locate and target the USSR’s small missile force and its bomber 
bases caused some Kremlin leaders to fear that the United States was moving toward a first-
strike doctrine. Public pronouncements of American superiority added to Soviet concern. Some 
Soviet officials accused the United States of preparing a surprise nuclear attack, and a statement 
attributed to President Kennedy in early 1962, suggesting that the United States would be 
prepared to use nuclear weapons first in certain circumstances, was apparently interpreted by 
Khrushchev as an effort to intimidate the Soviet Union. Finally, when Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara articulated the no-cities doctrine in June 1962, Soviet fears that the United States was 
pursuing a counterforce strategy were exacerbated.27 
 
Most Kremlinologists claim that, aside from the potential threat to Soviet deterrent forces, the 
nature of the nuclear balance raised serious foreign policy problems for Moscow.28 The crisis 
over Berlin in late 1961, which coincided with U.S. exposure of the missile gap myth, seemed to 
demonstrate to Soviet officials that it was no longer possible to sustain the image of superiority 
and underscored the danger as well as the futility of attempting to obtain political benefits 
through Sputnik diplomacy. The Kennedy administration’s posture during the Berlin crisis and 
the accelerated U.S. strategic buildup may have been viewed by the Kremlin as a systematic 
strategy to use nuclear power for diplomatic purposes. With the strategic balance shifted against 
them, Soviet leaders apparently feared that they might be unable to protect their vital interests in 
diplomatic dealings with the West and to maintain their image as leader of the Communist bloc. 
In addition, planned improvements in U.S. nonnuclear capabilities threatened to deprive the 
Soviet Union of its conventional superiority in Europe, and thus negate what the Kremlin 
considered to be a crucial counterweight to Washington’s nuclear advantage.29 
 
By mid-1962, therefore, the prospect of overwhelming U.S military superiority gave the Soviet 
Union a strong political, as well as military incentive to redress the balance of intercontinental 
strategic forces. It was not enough for the USSR to rely on its large medium-range missile and 
bomber capability targeted against Western Europe, since long-range strategic missiles had 
become the most relevant measure of nuclear strength. Ironically, Khrushchev’s rocket-rattling 
policy of the late 1950s had actually enhanced the value of these systems as political currency. 
But attempts to overtake the United States in numbers of intercontinental systems would have 
entailed a massive Soviet effort, for the United States had a considerable lead in ICBMs and 
SLBMs—apart from its established superiority in long-range bombers. Furthermore, the existing 
Soviet technology of slow-reacting missiles would have made a crash ICBM program 
particularly costly while yielding marginal security benefits. In any event, the Soviet leader 
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remained unwilling to commit his country to an enormously expensive strategic program that 
would detract from his ability to meet domestic requirements. Thus, Khrushchev was faced with 
the need to increase the USSR’s strategic strength rapidly while holding expenditures in check. 
 
Cuba offered a solution to Khrushchev’s dilemma. The Soviet Union had a foothold on the island 
and had begun supplying Castro with many types of arms, including surface-to-air missiles. By 
installing MR/IRBMs within range of the United States, Kremlin officials apparently concluded 
that they could obtain many of the benefits of an ICBM construction program more quickly and 
at less cost.30 The Soviet scheme made sense, and some U.S. intelligence analysts realized this. 
Although a number of important ancillary objectives were served by emplacing missiles in 
Cuba—and these considerations undoubtedly contributed to Moscow’s decision—the desire to 
redress the strategic balance was the primary motivation behind the Kremlin’s decision to install 
missiles on the island. Even Khrushchev later acknowledged that Soviet missiles “would have 
equalized what the West likes to call the balance of power,” although he claimed that the main 
Soviet goal was to defend Cuba. 
 
When the U.S. quarantine was imposed, the USSR had already delivered seventy-five 
MR/IRBMs—almost twice the number of ICBMs in their inventory—and there is no evidence 
that they intended to stop at that point.31 Missiles located in Cuba would have been vulnerable to 
nuclear and conventional strikes, but they would have made an attack by the United States more 
difficult, thereby strengthening the USSR’s deterrent until a survivable intercontinental force 
became available. At a minimum, Soviet officials may have felt that the deployment of a few 
hundred MR-IRBMs would have the political payoff of blunting the U.S. strategic advantage, 
possibly permitting Moscow to regain the strategic initiative.32 
 
As it turned out, the Cuban experience highlighted problems associated with the USSR’s inferior 
strategic position. Because of America’s recognized preponderance of strategic power during the 
crisis, the USSR was at a disadvantage psychologically as well as militarily. As the crisis 
intensified, Soviet officials feared that U.S. leaders, buttressed by strategic superiority, would be 
apt to initiate conventional military action on the assumption that the Soviet Union would be 
reluctant to respond with a nuclear strike. Soviet anxieties were heightened by President 
Kennedy’s reference to the full retaliatory policy in his statement of October 22, which the 
Kremlin may have perceived as a threat to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against the USSR 
if it did not remove the missiles. Through nonnuclear means, the Soviet Union could not have 
prevented the United States from invading Cuba or from destroying the missile sites with 
conventional air attacks. This feature could have resulted in adverse political consequences for 
the USSR. Yet, since U.S. strategic power more than neutralized that of the USSR, Soviet 
nuclear retaliation to U.S. air attacks or invasion would have been irrational. 
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Where Does This Put Us? 
At least four prominent intelligence guidelines present themselves in this discussion of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. In the first instance, the prevailing intelligence situation gave few grounds 
for being especially alert to the introduction of Soviet offensive missiles into Cuba. One should 
consider how different the outcome of the crisis might have been if the surreptitious introduction 
had not been detected until complete.33 Second, the American intelligence system, in fact, 
became attentive to the possibility of Soviet offensive missile deployment in Cuba, and, against 
considerable obstacles, persevered in the acquisition of additional data necessary to confirm the 
dire suspicions. Once the hard evidence was in hand, the U.S. Government demonstrated its 
capacity quickly and correctly to assess the situation, to frame and appropriate responses, and 
ultimately, to force the Soviets to back down. A less timely and professional intelligence 
performance would have significantly increased the dangers of the confrontation. Third, the key 
to converting a potential intelligence fiasco into an astute operation was the resourcefulness of 
dedicated personnel, following the discipline of their profession, even though largely self-
directed. A collaborative team of analysts, collectors, and consumers collectively focused on the 
intelligence target. Fourth, from an existing knowledge base, a model of the target was 
developed, and then the model was analyzed to extract information for additional collection. 
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